assurance(name) to read Registry’s Resolver provenance and routing-lock flags. Combine these with the deployment’s upgrade policy when assessing the implementation behind a payment instruction.
Universal mode obtains these facts through Lookup’s namespace metadata. Direct compatibility mode reads their Registry equivalents.
Limits of the result
The field nametrustworthy describes Resolver provenance. It is not a general payment-safety verdict.
An approved governed upgrade updates the namespace’s recorded code hash and upgrade counter without setting the taint flag. Therefore, resolverTainted: false does not mean the Resolver has never been upgraded. Inspect Registry’s native_code(node) and the governance policy for that context. The governed testnet rejects new irreversible routing locks, so an unlocked namespace can return trustworthy: false while ordinary resolution works.
- Payment records can change. Holders may still update their address, memo and text.
- Destinations can belong to another party. A holder can point to an exchange account; assurance does not verify the person behind a memo.
- Lookup and RPC remain trust boundaries. This result does not attest Lookup’s current code. Lookup governance can upgrade it without a mandatory delay, and reads depend on your RPC.
verifyPayment near confirmation. A locked Resolver does not remove a required memo or bind a later payment to an earlier lookup.